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Abstract 
With the advent and unprecedented popularity of the now ubiquitous social networking sites such as Google 
Friend, Facebook, MySpace, Twitter etc. in the personal sphere, and others such as LinkedIn in business circles, 
undesirable security and privacy risk issues have come to the forefront as a result of this extraordinary rapid 
growth. The most salient issues are mainly lack of trustworthiness; namely, those of security and privacy. We will 
address these issues by employing a quantitative approach to assess security and privacy risks for social networks 
already under pressure by users and policymakers for breaches in both quality and sustainability; and will also 
demonstrate, using a cost-optimal game-theoretical solution, how to manage and monitor risk. The applicability of 
this research to diverse fields from security to privacy and health care, as well as the currently popular social 
networks is an additional asset. A number of real people (not simulated) were interviewed and the results are 
discussed. Ramifications of this quantitative risk assessment of privacy and security breaches in social networks 
will be summarized. 
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1. Introduction  
The social networks and their related services have grown rapidly, but so has unwanted security and 
privacy challenges [1], [2], [3]. A major reason social network security and privacy lapses exist simply 
results from the astronomical amounts of information the sites process each and every day that end up 
making it that much easier to exploit a single flaw in the system. Features that invite user participation -
- messages, invitations, photos, open platform applications, etc. -- are often the avenues used to gain 
access to private information, especially in the case of Facebook. A Ph.D. candidate at Berkeley made 
small headlines last year when she exposed a potentially devastating hole in the framework of 
Facebook's third-party application programming interface (API) which allows for easy theft of private 
information. This candidate and her co-researchers found that third-party platform applications for 
Facebook gave developers access to far more information (addresses, pictures, interests, etc.) than 
needed to run the application (http://www.fastcompany.com/articles/2008/10/social-networking-
security.html). The problems now plaguing social networks, e.g.: security and privacy issues, can only 
be resolved if users take a more careful approach to what they share and how much privacy they value. 
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With the growth of social networks, it's becoming harder to effectively monitor and protect site users 
and their activity because the tasks of security programmers become increasingly spread out. This 
brings us to the difficult task of how to measure risk and mitigate it within a certain budget in a cost-
effective manner. 
Risk assessment methods may be classified as conventionally qualitative and newly quantitative, and 
recently hybrid [4], [5]. Such a quantitative approach for software assurance (the confidence in being 
free from intentional or accidental vulnerabilities) is used to determine and even manage security risk 
and has the advantages of being objective in terms of dollar figures [6]. A well-known management 
proverb says that “what is measured is managed” and another says, “Yes, you can quantify risk” 
balanced against reasons such as the difficulty in collecting trustworthy data regarding security and 
privacy breaches [7]. The Security Meter technique provides a quantitative alternative to the currently 
used purely qualitative models [4, 5], a method which has been theoretically validated [9]. This method, 
currently not addressed in the literature in the way proposed for the typical social networks we plan to 
study, is computationally intensive. The core of the matter is to come up with a set of effective risk 
quantification and  management techniques so as to help alleviate problems arising from lack of  
security and privacy due to mushrooming social networks as well their connect services.. 
2. Methods 
Innovative quantitative risk measurements are greatly needed to objectively compare risk 
alternatives and manage existing risks [5]. The proposed Security Meter (SM) design provides the 
means in a quantitative manner that is imperative in the security world [4]. For a practical and accurate 
statistical design, security breaches will be recorded so as to estimate the model’s input probabilities 
using the risk equations developed. Undesirable threats (with and without bluffs) that take advantage of 
hardware and software vulnerabilities can break down availability, integrity, confidentiality, 
nonrepudiation, and other aspects of software quality such as authentication, privacy, and encryption 
[6]. We must collect data for malicious attacks that have been either prevented or not prevented [5].  
Figure 1 below illustrates the constants in the SM model as the utility cost (dollar asset) and criticality 
constant; the probabilistic inputs are vulnerability, threat, and lack of countermeasure, all valued 
between 0 and 1 [4].  See Figure 1. SM is described as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Security Meter Model with probabilistic, deterministic inputs, calculated outputs. 
 
Probabilistic Tree Diagram: Given that a simple sample system or component has two or more 
outcomes for each risk factor, vulnerability, threat, and countermeasure, the following probabilistic 
framework holds for the sums ěvi = 1 and ětij = 1 for each i, and the sum of LCM + CM = 1 for each 
ij, within the tree diagram structure in Figure 2. Using the probabilistic inputs, we get the residual risk 
= vulnerability x threat x lack of countermeasure, where x denotes multiplication. That is, if we add all 
the residual risks due to lack of countermeasures, we can calculate the overall residual risk. Then we 
apply the capital investment cost to the final risk to determine the expected cost of loss (ECL), which 
helps to budget for avoiding (before the attack) or repairing (after the attack) the entire risk where the 
final risk = residual risk x criticality, whereas  ECL ($) = final risk x capital cost. 
Algorithmic Calculations: Figure 1 leads to the probabilistic tree diagram of Figure 2 in the 
Appendix to perform the calculations. For example, out of 100 malware attempts, the number of 
penetrating attacks not prevented will give the estimate of the percentage of LCM. One can then trace 
the root cause of the threat level retrospectively in the tree diagram. A cyber-attack example: 1) A 
hacking attack as a threat occurs. 2) The firewall software does not detect it. 3) As a result of this attack, 
whose root threat is known, the ‘network’ as vulnerability is exploited. Out of those cyber-attacks that 
are not prevented by a certain countermeasure (CM), how many of them were caused by threat 1 or 2, 
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etc., to a particular vulnerability 1 or 2, etc.? Residual Risk (RR) = Vulnerability x Threat x LCM, for 
each branch and then proceed by summing the RRs to obtain the total residual risk (TRR) [11] . 
3. Application Of The Propose Method For Privacy /Security Risk In Social Networks 
Here are some threats listed respectively from the above listed vulnerabilities regarding social 
networks. The major privacy/security related vulnerabilities in typical social networks vary from i) 
Correspondence, ii) Internet Connectivity, iii) Personal Identity, iv) Health, v) Career, vi) Legal, vii) 
Personal Software to viii) Password. 
That is for i) Correspondence: 1) VoIP Calls, 2) Phishing, 3) E-Mail Hijacking, 4) Internet Chat, 5) 
Cell-Phone Software, 6) Blue Tooth Devices, 7) Electronic Commerce; for ii) Internet Connectivity: 1) 
Cookies, 2) HTTP, 3) Browsers, 4) Search Engines, 5) Spam; for iii) Personal Identity: 1) ISP, 2) 
Social Sites,3) Social Engineering; for iv) Health: 1) Prescription Tracking, 2) Medical Office Website 
Records; for v) Career related: 1) Job applications(Sites and Applications), 2) HR Department records, 
3) Benefits Records; for vi) Legal related: 1) Personal Documents, 2) Lawyer related files; for vii) 
Personal Software (Facebook style): 1) Index.dat, 2) Software Purchased, 3) Freeware-Shareware and 
viii) Password Theft:  1) Keystroke Listening, 2) Monitor Glow, 3) Guess Online, 4) Encrypted 
Password, 5) Dictionary Attack, 6) Easily Guessed Passwords, 7) Insider Intrusion, 8) Outsider 
Intrusion, 9) Picture Taking, 10) Shoulder Surfing, 11) Social Engineering, and 12) Using Bugs 
(Microphones). 
4. Clarifications For Applications In Figure 2 and Table 2 and Table 1 (Appendix) on Privacy 
and Security Risk Survey 
Seven graduate students were surveyed at METU (Middle East Technical University) in Ankara 
during April 2011.  Only their first names were used by consent. Their risk scores ranked were as 
follows: Gul(.23), Sipan(.24), Fidan (.27), Tugba(.35), Sibel(.52), Fatih(.56), Konul (.57). An 
arithmetic average of 40% risk was recorded. Since no such average real person exists as representative 
of the sample, the median with 35% was taken as a measure of central tendency. However, the 
maximum and minimum cases were considered with 57% and 23% respectively so as to execute the 
worst- and best case risk management scenarios to see extent of precautions. The risk analyses that 
belong to the median score (by Tugba) are tabulated in Table 1, including cost-optimal risk 
management. 
Now, to mitigate Median student: Tugba’s privacy/security risk from 34.5% down to 24%,  i) 
increase the CM capacity for the threat of “E-Mail hijacking” in the vulnerability of “Correspondence”  
from 85% to 100% for an improvement of 15%, ii) increase the CM capacity for the threat of “E-
Commerce” in the vulnerability of “Correspondence”  from 69.5% to 100% for an improvement of 
30.50%  iii) increase the CM capacity for the threat of “Easily guessed passwords” in the vulnerability 
of “Password”  from 50% to 64.36% for an improvement of 14.36 A total cost of $841.76 is allocated. 
We can recursively continue to mitigate the present risk of 24% (down from an initial 35%) to lower 
target values such as 10% if we have sufficient budget remaining for further improvement. This is to 
say that Median: Tugba will implement the above clarified countermeasures by purchasing the services 
needed to mitigate her privacy/security risk from 35% to a low of 24%. She will do that by simply 
referring to the CM questions as cited, and converting the negative (No) responses to positives (Yes) by 
taking countermeasures. While doing so, she will optimize her costs by following the optimal 
allocation plan suggested by the Security Meter’s game-theoretical solutions as explained in Section IV 
and Table I inspired by Figure 2, both placed in the Appendix respectively. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Given the rising popularity of social networks, it is little surprise that there have been numerous 
high profile breaches of security and privacy on sites such as MySpace and Facebook. With over 500 
million members combined, all it takes is one single person to cause major damage. But security issues 
and privacy issues are entirely two different topics. A security issue occurs when a hacker gains 
unauthorized access to a site's protected coding or written language. Privacy issues, those involving the 
unwarranted access of private information, don't necessarily have to involve security breaches. 
Someone can gain access to confidential information by simply watching you type your password. But 
both types of breaches are often intertwined on social networks, especially since anyone who breaches 
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a site's security network opens the door to easy access to private information belonging to any user. But 
the potential harm to an individual user really stems from how much a user engages in social 
networking sites, and especially the amount of information they're willing to share.  
      In brief, the proposed Security Meter (SM) technique is a practical tool for assessing overall risk 
quantitatively and then minimizing the cost to mitigate risk to a desired level applied to the now 
ubiquitous social networks with ever rising risk factors. It is an adaptable framework that can be 
customized and configured by the analyst with no custom coding (XML inputs). In contrast to the 
current quantitative approaches such as the CVSS (NIST) ranking systems, the SM provides objective 
and scientific guidance in allocating budgetary resources for managing risk in accordance with the 
provider’s budget, which the proposed SM may aid in planning and forecasting. The SM, which 
possesses an avenue for eliciting data from expert opinion if numerical data are not available, therefore 
shifts from the current subjective and crude risk evaluation mechanisms to a verifiable and quantitative 
methodology of risk assessment and management. This may positively result in an optimized 
expenditure of security/privacy remediation dollars.  This way, much contested social networks can be 
risk-quantified by providing the right set of input data, categorical and numerical, as demonstrated in 
the above sections.  
Even more importantly, what to do next, and in what priority order by minimizing cost to mitigate 
the risk to a tolerable level are very significant points to consider. The purported goal is to supervise 
and control software systems that influence our lives by reducing the risks to privacy and security 
affecting hundreds of millions of people today from all walks of life [10]. For further research, an 
updated new tree diagram combining the two existing tree diagrams of security and privacy into one 
large scenario would be worth considering for typical and popular social networks. Protecting social 
networks at the interface of the two disjoint fronts of security and privacy issues is a first wise step to 
take. The ultimate goal is to face the collective challenge of quantifying and managing the adversarial 
risk of security and privacy together due to pervasive malware and malicious users that attack the cyber 
system from all corners. The surveyed data acquired from a sample of 7 college students at METU, 
Ankara indicated (40%) that on the average one of two are adversely affected by privacy/security 
breaches of some sort whether it be social or health or any privacy/security related network. As in 
medical science, if you can diagnose the malady, then you can attempt to cure it. This is what this 
research purports to achieve by further mitigating the risk from an undesirable percentage to a tolerable 
lower level concurrently minimizing the cost of optimized countermeasures employing the game-
theory essentials. Another valid application area for this method is the banks proper where billions of 
monetary losses due to breach of privacy is already damaging economic progress [8]. 
The validity of this research endeavor will be enhanced the more users go on line and make their 
opinions heard. An independent third party can be hired by social networks to process these opinion 
surveys as illustrated.  This auditing type of activity will help not only the social networks to improve 
their services to alleviate breach of privacy and security but also the mainstream public user majority. 
This way, the users by the millions will be aware of the shortfalls and can correct their usage of the 
social networks, and can mitigate risk by self-disciplining and monitoring as shown by the proposed 
algorithm. After all, it is not all fun and games because incorrect and unscrupulous socializing may 
damage relations, bank accounts, and friendships. Why do not we start now by first identifying soft 
spots, then taking measures, rather than worrying non-stop about the social networks’ privacy risks? 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE I.  EXAMPLE OF A GAME-THEORETIC COST OPTIMAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS FOR FIGURE 2 
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Figure 2. An Example of Privacy/Security Risk Meter Tree Diagram. 
 
